A Tale of two Extension Applications

It was the best of the outcomes. It was worst of outcomes, short of outright refusal.

For Richard Albarran two court judgments demonstrate how Hall Chadwick‘s appointment-taker-in-chief has recently experienced the full gamut of judicial reaction in respect of two quite different applications to extend second meeting convening periods.

“”The circumstances in which this application came to be made were thus unsatisfactory, and care should be taken to ensure that they are not repeated,” Federal Court judge Nicholas Owens.

In Albarran, in the matter of Chala Metals Limited [2025] FCA 984 Federal Court judge Nick Owens prefaced his reasons for approving an application to extend the convening period for three months with a series of “preliminary observations” conveying deep disapproval.

The application was late. Insufficient time was allowed for this “busy duty judge” – inevitably dealing with matters of “unavoidable urgency” – to deliberate. The administrator’s lawyer had taken leave and nothing had been done to advance the application while she was away. Nor was notice to creditors provided.

“The first notice that the Court received of the potential for the present application was an email to my chambers at 7:46pm on the evening of 18 August 2025, requesting a hearing at 10:00am the following day, 19 August 2025,” the judge said.

“That email stated that the application was urgent, because the convening period would, unless extended, expire on 21 August 2025. There was thus a period of two days within which the application was required to be determined.

“Considered in isolation, of course, a two-day period is more than ample to deal with an application of this kind.

It will rarely be the case, however, that a busy duty judge will have no other demands upon his or her time, including matters of genuinely unavoidable urgency.

“In those circumstances, as Williams J observed in Hamelin Brands at [35], the creation of an artificial urgency “interferes with the orderly and efficient management of the publicly funded resources of the Court that must be available for all litigants to call upon”.

“There will of course be situations where applications of this kind can only be made on short notice. This was not such a case.

“I was informed that instructions to bring the application had been provided by the plaintiffs to their solicitor on 8 August 2025.

“As will become apparent, even by that point it must have been clear for some time to the administrators that they would wish to seek an extension.

“In any event, those instructions were received on the last day that the solicitor responsible for the matter was at work before taking holidays, returning to work on 18 August 2025.

“The matter was not progressed during her absence. No attempt whatsoever was made to notify creditors that the application would be made, or even that it was in contemplation.

“The circumstances in which this application came to be made were thus unsatisfactory, and care should be taken to ensure that they are not repeated,” the judge said.

That’s akin to a bollocking in anyone’s book and could not be further from the sentiment expressed by Justice Owens’ colleague Elizabeth Cheeseman in Vouris, in the matter of Rapid Response Revival Research Limited (Administrators Appointed) [2025] FCA 850.

Despite coming before her honour as an “urgent application” the judge found no reason to abhor at length the shortcoming of the kind Justice Owen identified.

Instead the application brought by Albarran’s colleague John Vouris on behalf of himself, Albarran, Kijurina and Dominish as administrators of Rapid Response Revival Research Limited and six related entities appears to have been an exemplar of its kind. And yes, Vouris retained different lawyers.

“The evidence demonstrates that in the short period available to them the Administrators have commenced preliminary work, and on this basis, I accept that the period of the extension has been justified on an informed basis, including by reference to Mr Vouris’ experience in arranging for the sale of business assets, both domestically and internationally,” Justice Cheeseman said.

“Prudently, the time of the extension has been calculated to allow for some contingency in the event of complications arising with the international sales campaign or in the due diligence processes with potential purchasers.”

In ordering that the costs of the application be costs in the administration her honour added: “There is no suggestion that the Administrators have acted other than diligently and in good faith in making this application.”